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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XVI FEBRUARY, 1931 No. 2
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, SECTIONS 19-51,*
WITH MISSOURI ANNOTATIONSt
By TYRRELL WILLIAMS
Chapter 3
FORMATION OF INFOTMAL CONTRACTS
ToPic A. GeneraZ Requirements
Section 19. REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW FOR FORMATION OF
AN INFORMAL CONTRACT.
The requirements of the law for the formation of an informal
contract are:
(a) A promisor and a promisee each of whom has legal capac-
ity to act as such in the proposed contract;
(b) A manifestation of assent by the parties who form the
contract to the terms thereof, and by every promisor to the con-
sideration for his promise, except as otherwise stated in Sections
85 to 94;
(c) A sufficient consideration except as otherwise stated in
Sections 85 to 94;
(d) The transaction, though satisfying the foregoing require-
* Copyright, 1928, The American Law Institute.
t Copyright, 1931, by Washington University. Previous sections of the
Restatement, similarly annotated, will be found in the ST. Louis LAW RE-
Vim for December, 1930.
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ments, must be one that is not void by statute or by special rules
of the common law.
Comment:
a. The explanation of the requirements of Clause (a) belongs
in the Restatement of the law of Persons; the explanation of
the requirements of Clause (d) is given in a later Chapter of
the Restatement of Contracts; the explanation of the require-
ments of Clauses (b) and (c) is given in the following Sections
of this Chapter.
Annotation:
This Section is not inconsistent with Missouri law. As stated
under Section 11, an informal contract is a simple contract. "A
contract is an agreement between two or more persons, compe-
tent to contract, upon a sufficient consideration, to do or not to
do some particular thing, the essential elements of which 'are
the existence of two or more contracting parties, a meeting of
their minds, by which each gives his voluntary assent to the
thing agreed upon, and an obligation, either created or dissolved,
which constitutes the subject-matter of the undertaking.'"
Cockrell v. McIntyre (1901) 161 Mo. 59, 61 S. W. 648.
R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 2164 contains important limitations on the
legal capacity of municipal corporations to contract.
Atwater v. Edwards Brokerage Company (1910) 147 Mo.
App. 436, 126 S. W. 823 discusses illegality of contract by com-
mon law and also by statute.
Questions of assent and consideration will be treated in later
Sections of this Chapter.
TOPIC B. Manifestation of Assent
Section 20. MANIFESTATION OF MUTUAL ASSENT NECESSARY.
A manifestation of mutual assent by the parties to an informal
contract is essential to its formation and the acts by which such
assent is manifested must be done with the intent to do those
acts; but, except as qualified by Sections 55, 71 and 72, neither
mental assent to the promises in the contract nor real or ap-
parent intent that the promises shall be legally binding is es-
sential.
Comment:
a. Mutual assent to the formation of informal contracts is
operative only to the extent that it is manifested. Moreover, if
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the manifestation is at variance with the mental intent, subject
to the slight exception stated in Section 71, it is the expression
which is controlling. Not mutual assent but a manifestation
indicating such assent is what the law requires. Nor is it es-
sential that the parties are conscious of the legal relations which
their words or acts give rise to. It is essential, however, that
the acts manifesting assent shall be done intentionally. That is,
there must be a conscious will to do those acts; but it is not ma-
terial what induces the will. Even insane persons may so act;
but a somnambulist could not.
Iflutrations:
1. A offers to sell B his library at a stated price, forget-
ting that his favorite Shakespeare, which he did not intend
to sell, is in the library. B accepts the offer. B is entitled
to have the Shakespeare.
2. A orally promises to sell B a book in return for B's
promise to pay $5. A and B both think such promises are
not binding unless in writing. Nevertheless there is a
contract.
3. A offers a reward to any one who will deliver to him a
certain book or who will promise to do so. B, who owns the
book requested, learns of the offer, but is not induced there-
by to part with the book. C, learning the facts, threatens
B with such personal violence unless he delivers or promises
to deliver the book to A that, rather than fail to comply with
C's demand, B would have given A the book for nothing;
but knowing of the offer he determines to accept it, and he
either gives A the book or promises A to do so. On the first
supposition there is a unilateral contract; on the second a
bilateral contract.
4. A writes an offer to B, which he encloses in an envelope
and stamps. Shortly afterwards, he decides not to send
the offer and determines to throw the letter into his waste-
basket. Absent-mindedly, he takes it up with other letters
and deposits it in a mail chute. It is delivered to B, who
accepts the offer. There is a contract.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with modern Missouri law. Mis-
souri seems committed to the objective and not the subjective
test. The important element is not the secret thought but the
external manifestation. "Judicial opinion and elementary
treatises abound in statements of the rule that to constitute a
contract there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties, and
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both must agree to the same thing in the same sense. Generally
speaking, this may be true; but it is not literally or universally
true. That is to say, the inner intention of parties to a conver-
sation subsequently alleged to create a contract cannot either
make a contract of what transpired, or prevent one from arising,
if the words used were sufficient to constitute a contract."
Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co. (1907) 127 Mo.
App. 383, 105 S. W. 777. To the same effect: Seavy & Flarsheim
Brokerage Co. v. Monarch Peanut Co. (Mo. App. 1922) 241 S. W.
643. Girard v. St. Louis Car-Wheel Co. (1894) 123 Mo. 358, 27
S. W. 648 shows that the objective theory does not prevent the
application of legal principles for avoiding a contract on the
ground of fraud. See also Ely v. Sutton (1914) 177 Mo. App.
546, 162 S. W. 755. As to the important and unsettled relation-
ship between a negligent promisor and a fraudulent promisee in
an express contract, see Tait v. Locke (1908) 130 Mo. App. 273,
109 S. W. 105.
Section 21. ACTS AS MANIFESTATION OF ASSENT.
The manifestation of mutual assent may consist wholly or
partly of acts, other than written or spoken words.
Comment:
a. Words are not the only medium of expression. Conduct
may often convey as clearly as words a promise or an assent to
a proposed promise, and where no particular requirement of
form is made by the law a condition of the validity or enforce-
ability of a contract, there is no distinction in the effect of a
promise whether it is expressed (1) in writing, (2) orally, (3)
in acts, or (4) partly in one of these ways and partly in others.
(See Illustrations under Section 5.)
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. "There can be
no contract without the assent of the parties thereto. But this
assent may be indicated in various ways. The courts cannot
say what facts, or words, or actions indicate the agreement be-
tween parties. Each case must be governed by the facts and
circumstances developed, and by which the triers of the fact
must be led to the truth." Botkin v. McIntyre (1884) 81 Mo.
557. To the same effect: Allen v. Chouteau (1890) 102 Mo.
309, 14 S. W. 869, paying taxes for another; National Surety
Co. v. Equitable Surety Co. (Mo. App. 1922) 242 S. W. 109, col-
lecting insurance premiums; Austin v. Burge (1911) 156 Mo.
App. 286, 137 S. W. 618, taking newspaper regularly from post
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office. See also Williams v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement
Co. (Mo. App. 1917) 198 S. W. 425, principle considered but
not applicable to facts.
Section 22. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE.
The manifestation of mutual assent almost invariably takes
the form of an offer or proposal by one party accepted by the
other party or parties.
Comment:
a. This rule is rather one of necessity than of law. In the
nature of the case one party must ordinarily first announce what
he will do before there can be any manifestation of mutual as-
sent. It is theoretically possible for a third person to state a
suggested contract to the parties and for them to say simulta-
neously that they assent to the suggested bargain, but such a case
is so rare, and the decision of it so clear that it is practically
negligible.
Annotation:
This is in accord with Missouri law. "A binding contract
can only occur when the offer made is met by an acceptance
which corresponds with the offer made in every particular."
Robinson v. Railway Company (1882) 75 Mo. 494. To the same
effect: Schepers v. Union Depot R. Co. (1895) 126 Mo. 665, 29
S. W. 712.
Section 23. NECESSITY OF COMMUNICATION OF AN OFFER.
Except as qualified by Section 70, it is essential to the existence
of an offer that it be a proposal by the offeror to the offeree, and
that it become known to the offeree. It is not essential that the
manifestation shall accurately convey the thought in the offeror's
mind.
Comment:
a. Two manifestations of willingness to make the same bar-
gain do not constitute a contract unless one is made with refer-
ence to the other. An offeree, therefore, cannot accept an offer
unless it has been communicated to him by the offeror. This
may be done through the medium of an agent; but mere in-
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formation indirectly received by one party that another is will-
ing to enter into a certain bargain is not an offer by the latter.
Illustrations:
1. A advertises that he will give a specified reward for
certain information; or writes to B a similar proposal. B
gives the information in ignorance of the advertisement, or
without having received the letter. There is no communica-
tion of the offer and there is no contract.
2. A sends B an offer through the mail to sell A's horse
for $500. While this offer is in the mail, B, in ignorance
thereof, mails to A an offer to pay $500 for the horse.
There is no communication of A's offer, and there is no
contract.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. "No case has
been cited where it has been held that the offeree can accept the
term of an offer before it is communicated to him so as to bind
the offerer." James & Sons v. Fruit Jar & Bottle Co. (1897) 69
Mo. App. 207. The principle is applied to reward cases. "The
offer of a reward is the same as any other contractual offer and
must be known and accepted by being acted upon." Smith v.
Vernon County (1905) 87 S. W. 949, 188 Mo. 501. For justifica-
tion of the second sentence, see cases cited in annotation under
Section 20.
Section 24. OFFER DEFINED.
An offer is a promise which is in its terms conditional upon an
act, forbearance or return promise being given in exchange for
the promise or its performance. An offer is also a contract, com-
monly called an option, if the requisites of a formal or an in-
formal contract exist, or if the rule stated in Section 47 is ap-
plicable.
Comment:
a. In an offer for a unilateral contract the offeror's promise is
conditional upon an act other than a promise being given except
in cases covered by Section 57. In an offer for a bilateral con-
tract the offeror's promise is always conditional upon a return
promise being given. The return promise may be in the form of
assent to the proposal in the offer. (See Illustration 1 under
Section 29.) In order that a promise shall amount to an offer,
performance of the condition in the promise must appear by
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its terms to be the price or exchange for the promise or its per-
formance. The promise must not be merely performable on a
certain contingency.
b. All offers are promises of the kind stated in this Section
and all promises of this kind are offers if there has been no prior
offer of the same tenor to the promisor. But if there has al-
ready been such an offer to enter into a bilateral contract, an
acceptance thereof, like the offer itself, will be a promise of the
kind stated in the Section.
Special Note: The word "option" is often used for a con-
tinuing offer although it is revocable for lack of considera-
tion; but more commonly the word is used to denote an offer
which is irrevocable and therefore a contract.
Illustrations:
1. A says to B, "This book is yours if you promise to pay
me $5 for it." A's offer is a promise in terms conditional
on receiving a promise of $5 from B.
2. A offers, in a sealed writing, Blackaere to B at a stated
price. Subsequently, before the lapse of a reasonable time
for acceptance, A informs B that the offer is revoked. The
offer is a contract and the attempted revocation is in-
effectual.
3. A promises B $100 if B goes to college. If the prom-
ise, under the surrounding circumstances, is reasonably to
be understood, not as requesting B to go to college and
undertaking to pay him for so doing, but as promising a
gratuity on a certain contingency, there is no offer.
Special Note: An offer necessarily looks to the future. It
is an expression by the offeror of his agreement that some-
thing over which he at least assumes to have control shall
be done or happen or shall not be done or happen if the con-
ditions stated in the offer are complied with. Even in cases
which seem at first sight to involve no promise by the of-
feror, analysis will disclose that such a promise exists, if
the word is given the definition in Section 2. In such a case
as that in Illustration 1, it may be urged that the offeror is
expected to do nothing in fulfillment of his offer; that he
has simply given a power to the offeree by virtue of which
the latter on promising to pay the price will immediately
become owner of the chattel. But though the owner need
do nothing in fulfillment of his offer, and though it is self-
operative if accepted, it nevertheless involves a promise on
the part of the offeror that the offeree shall become owner
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of the chattel if he accepts during the continuance of the
offer. This is shown by the fact that the offeror would be
liable to the acceptor if he had no title to the chattel and
therefore the offeree acquired none by his acceptance; yet
the question whether the words of the offeror amount to a
promise can hardly depend on the extrinsic facts determin-
ing his ownership or lack of it. Though the offeror is to do
nothing, he does undertake or promise that something shall
come to pass on the performance of the condition stated in
the offer.
Moreover, an offer which does not in terms state that it is
revocable includes a promise, though not a binding promise,
that the power given by the offer shall continue for the
period named in the offer; or, if no period is named, for a
reasonable time; and even if in terms revocable at any mo-
ment, it is still a promise, operative until revoked.
Confusion sometimes is caused by regarding an offer and
a contract as antithetical. But since an offer is a promise,
and as a promise becomes a contract if consideration is
given for it or if it is under seal (where the common-law ef-
fect of seals is unchanged) an offer may also be a contract.
Annotation:
The first sentence of this Section is in accord with Missouri
law. In Brown v. Rice (1860) 29 Mo. 322, the court described
a gratuitous conditional unaccepted offer and said it was a "mere
promise, not a contract." See also Lapsley v. Howard (1894)
119 Mo. 489, 24 S. W. 1020, promise to release mortgage on pay-
ment of money; Groomer v. McCully (1902) 93 Mo. App. 544,
promise to pay money if title to land is perfected; Sarran v.
Richards (1910) 151 Mo. App. 656, 132 S. W. 285, promise to
pay money conditional on return promise to convey land. The
promissory offer is sometimes contained in a paper called an
order. Outcault Advertising Co. v. Wilson (1915) 186 Mo. App.
492, 172 S. W. 394; Bronson v. Weber Implement Co. (1909) 135
Mo. App. 483, 116 S. W. 20. Promise to render a gratuity if
accepted by offeree is not an offer to contract; in doubtful cases
"no absolute rule of law can be laid down." Whaley v. Peak
(1871) 49 Mo. 80. See also Lillard v. Wilson (1903) 178 Mo.
145, 77 S. W. 74.
Options. In Missouri for practical purposes the distinction be-
tween formal and informal contracts is abolished. See Section
7. Otherwise the second sentence of Section 24 is in accord with
Missouri law. Aiple-Hemmelman Real Estate Co. v. Spelbrink
(1908) 211 Mo. 671, 111 S. W. 480, $50 paid for written option
to buy land at $20,000, and specific performance appropriate
remedy for breach; Yontz v. MeVean (1920) 202 Mo. App. 377,
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217 S. W. 1000, $80 paid for valid option to buy 8000 bushels of
corn at $1.40 per bushel, and option defined as "right of election
to exercise a privilege"; Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.
(1926) 313 Mo. 552, 281 S. W. 744, consideration not money paid
but services rendered; Warren v. Castello (1892) 109 Mo. 338,
19 S. W. 29, alleged option not binding in absence of considera-
tion; Hooker Steam Pump Co. v. Buss (1912) 240 Mo. 465, 144
S. W. 419, a valid option incidental to a principal contract.
Section 25. WHEN A MANIFESTATION OF INTENTION Is NOT
AN OFFE.
If from a promise, or manifestation of intention, or from the
circumstances existing at the time, the person to whom the
promise or manifestation is addressed knows or has reason to
know that the person making it does not intend it as an expres-
sion of his fixed purpose until he has given a further expression
of assent, he has not made an offer.
Comment:
a. It is often difficult to draw an exact line between offers and
negotiations preliminary thereto. It is common for one who
wishes to make a bargain to try to induce the other party to the
intended transaction to make the definite offer, he himself sug-
gesting with more or less definiteness the nature of the contract
he is willing to enter into. Besides any direct language indi-
cating an intent to defer the formation of a contract, the
definiteness or indefiniteness of the words used in opening the
negotiation must be considered, as well as the customs of busi-
ness, and indeed all surrounding circumstances.
Illustrations:
1. A, a clothing merchant, advertises overcoats of a certain
kind for sale at $50. This is not an offer, but an invitation
to the public to come and purchase.
2. A writes to B, "I can quote you flour at $5 a barrel in
carload lots." This is not an offer. The word "quote" and
the incompleteness of the terms indicate that the writer is
simply naming a current price which he is demanding.
3. A advertises that he will pay $5 for every copy of a
certain book that may be sent to him. This is an offer and
A is bound to pay $5 for every copy sent while the offer is
unrevoked.
4. A writes to B, "I am eager to sell my house. I wish to
get $20,000 for it." B promptly answers saying, "I will
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buy your house at the price you name in your letter." There
is no contract. A's letter is a mere request or suggestion
that an offer be made to him.
5. A corporation or municipality advertises for a bid, or
tender, for certain work. This is not an offer but a re-
quest for offers.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. A preliminary
negotiation must be distinguished from a contractual offer.
"When the intent expressed in the advertised proposal is re-
duced to certainty by interpretation, our system of administra-
tion of law is fully capable of giving effect to that intent."
Anderson v. Public Schools (1894) 122 Mo. 61, 27 S. W. 610.
The printed advertisement of a trust company containing the
clause "allows interest on deposits," is not a contractual offer.
Stone v. St. Louis Union Trust Company (1910) 150 Mo. App.
331, 130 S. W. 825. Other illustrative cases are: Gray v. Toledo,
St. L. & W. R. Co. (1910) 143 Mo. App. 251, 128 S. W. 227;
James & Sons v. Fruit Jar & Bottle Co. (1897) 69 Mo. App. 207.
Where parties manifestly intend not to be bound until a subse-
quent writing is prepared and signed, no contract exists. Eads
v. City of Carondelet (1867) 42 Mo. 113.
As to auction, see Section 27.
Section 26. CONTRACT MAY EXIST THOUGH WRITTEN MEMO-
RIAL IS CONTEMPLATED.
Mutual manifestations of assent that are in themselves suffi-
cient to make a contract will not be prevented from so operating
by the mere fact that the parties also manifest an intention to
prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof; but other facts
may show that the manifestations are merely preliminary ex-
pressions as stated in Section 25.
Comment:
a. Parties who plan to make a final written instrument as the
expression of their contract, necessarily discuss the proposed
terms of the contract before they enter into it, and often before
the final writing is made, agree upon all the terms which they
plan to incorporate therein. This they may do orally or by ex-
change of several writings. It is possible thus to make a con-
tract to execute subsequently a final writing which shall contain
certain provisions. If parties have definitely agreed that they
will do so, and that the final writing shall contain these pro-
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visions and no others, they have then fulfilled all the requisites
for the formation of a contract. On the other hand, if the pre-
liminary agreement is incomplete, it being apparent that the
determination of certain details is deferred until the writing is
made out; or if an intention is manifested in any way that legal
obligations between the parties shall be deferred until the writ-
ing is made, the preliminary negotiations and agreements do
not constitute a contract.
b. The matter may be put in this way: If the parties indicate
that the expected document is to be a mere "memorial" of
operative facts already existing, its non-existence does not pre-
vent those facts from having their normal legal operation. What
that operation is must be determined largely by oral testimony,
or by preliminary or only partially complete writings. If the
parties indicate that the expected document is to be the exclusive
operative consummation of the negotiation, their preceding com-
munications will not be operative as offer or acceptance. This
also must be shown largely by oral testimony.
c. If the written document is prepared and executed, the legal
relations of the parties are then largely determined by that docu-
ment, because of the so-called "Parol Evidence Rule," even
though there was a binding informal contract previously made
(see Section 233).
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. "Where the
parties have assented to all the terms of a contract, the mere
reference to a future contract in writing does not negative the
existence of a present contract." Green v. Cole (1891) 103 Mo.
70, 15 S. W. 317. See also Allen v. Chouteau (1890) 102 Mo.
309, 14 S. W. 869; Wilson v. Board of Education (1876) 63 Mo.
137; Young v. Lanyon (Mo. App. 1922) 242 S. W. 685; Gale v.
Kennard Carpet Co. (1914) 182 Mo. App. 498, 165 S. W. 842.
Bottom Produce Co. v. Olsen (1915) 188 Mo. App. 181, 175 S. W.
126 applies the rule of this Section to an involved set of facts.
The case also states that if a preliminary agreement constitutes
a contract, the erroneous supposition of the parties as to the
legal necessity of a subsequent writing is immaterial.
For illustration of last clause of Section 26, see Eads v. City
of Carondelet (1867) 42 Mo. 113.
Comment c is in accord with Missouri law. Tuggles v. Calli-
son (1898) 143 Mo. 527, 45 S. W. 291; Plumb v. Cooper (1894)
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121 Mo. 668, 26 S. W. 678; Railway Co. v. Cleary (1883) 77 Mo.
634; Chrisman v. Hodges (1882) 75 Mo. 413, decided on parol
evidence rule; Leonard v. Railway Co. (1893) 54 Mo. App. 293,
decided on theory that cancellation of oral contract is considera-
tion for subsequent written contract.
If cause of action has accrued on oral contract, the subsequent
written contract does not operate as a discharge of liability un-
less there is a clear provision to that effect supported by adequate
consideration. Harrison v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (1881) 74
Mo. 364; Fountain v. Wabash R. Co. (1905) 114 Mo. App. 676,
90 S. W. 393; Hoover v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. (1905) 113 Mo.
App. 688, 88 S. W. 769; Gann v. Railway Co. (1897) 72 Mo,
App. 84.
Section 27. AUCTIONS; SALES WITHOUT RESERVE.
At an auction, the auctioneer merely invites offers from suc-
cessive bidders unless, by announcing that the sale is without
reserve or by other means, he indicates that he is making an of-
fer to sell at any price bid by the highest bidder.
Comment:
a. An auction as ordinarily conducted furnishes an illustra-
tion of the principle stated in Section 25. The auctioneer, by
beginning to auction property, does not impliedly say: "I offer
to sell this property to whichever one of you makes the highest
bid," but rather requests that the bidders make offers to him, as
indeed he frequently states in his remarks to those before him.
b. It is a corollary of the principle stated in this Section taken
in connection with Section 41 that, where the auctioneer merely
invites offers, a bidder may withdraw his bid at any time before
the fall of the hammer. A bid in such a case is a revocable of-
fer. If the auctioneer has made an offer inviting acceptances,
a bid is an acceptance and completes a contract, binding both
auctioneer and bidder; but the contract is conditional on no
higher bid being made before the fall of the hammer.
Illustrations:
1. A publishes a notice saying that he will sell his house-
hold goods at public auction at a specific time and place.
This in no way affects his legal relations.
2. A's auctioneer, in Illustration 1, at the specified time
and place holds up a chattel and says, "How much am I bid
for this?" After each bid is made he urges others to bid
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higher. Each bidder makes an offer to the auctioneer, but
he makes no offer to them.
3. A advertises, "I offer my farm Blackacre for sale to
the highest bidder and undertake to make conveyance to
such person as submits the highest bid within the next thirty
days." This is an offer, and each bid operates as an ac-
ceptance creating rights and duties conditional on no higher
bid being received within thirty days.
4. A advertises a sale of his household furniture without
reserve. An article is put up for sale at the auction and B
is the highest bona fide bidder; but A, dissatisfied with the
bidding, either accepts a higher fictitious bid from an agent
employed for the purpose, or openly withdraws the article
from sale. He also withdraws all the rest of the furniture
from the sale. In either case A is bound by contract to B
to sell to him the article on which he was the highest bona
fide bidder, but neither B nor the others at the auction have
legal ground for complaint that the remainder of the furni-
ture not yet actually put up for sale is withdrawn from sale.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. The principle
in the first part of the Section often has been illustrated in
judicial auction sales. "An officer selling property under exe-
cution is the agent of both the plaintiff and defendant, and he is
bound to protect the interests of all parties concerned, and is
not bound to accept a bid without reserve." Shaw. v. Potter
(1872) 50 Mo. 281. Other judicial auction cases are: Davis v.
McCann (1898) 143 Mo. 172, 44 S. W. 795; Rogers & Baldwin
Hardware Co. v. Cleveland Bldg. Co. (1896) 132 Mo. 442, 34
S. W. 57; State ex rel. v. Moore (1880) 72 Mo. 285. For a case
announcing the same rule at a private auction, see Richardson v.
Landreth (Mo. App. 1924) 260 S. W. 128. In Springer v.
Kleinsorge (1884) 83 Mo. 152, the facts justified the indication
of an auction without reserve, but the rule in the latter part of
the Section was avoided to protect the highest bidder because of
fraudulent by-bidding induced by the vendor. By reason of the
Statute of Frauds, the highest bidder may in some cases have
opportunity after the fall of the hammer to avoid liability by
withdrawing his bid at any time up to the entry of his name in
the auctioneer's memorandum book. Dunham v. Hartman
(1900) 153 Mo. 625, 55 S. W. 233.
Section 28. To WHOM AN OFFER MAY BE MADE.
An offer may be made to a specified person or persons or class
of persons, or it may be made to anyone or to everyone to whom
it becomes known. The person or persons in whom is created a
Washington University Open Scholarship
100 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
power of acceptance are to be determined by the reasonable in-
terpretation of the offer.
Comment:
a. An offer may give many persons a power of acceptance.
In some such cases the exercise of the power by one person will
extinguish the power of every other person; in other cases this
will not be true. The decision depends on interpretation of the
offer.
Illustrations:
1. A publishes an offer of reward to whoever will give
him certain information. This creates a power of accept-
ance in every person learning of the offer. B is the first of
stch persons to give the information. He thereby accepts
the offer. Since the reasonable interpretation of the offer
is that the information is to be paid for only once, the giving
of the information by B terminates the power of every other
person.
2. A, a bank, issues a traveler's letter of credit promising
to repay anyone who makes advances to the holder of the
letter, up to a certain amount. This creates a power of ac-.
ceptance in B, C and D, and all others to whom the letter is
successively presented by the holder with a request for an
advance, as long as the maximum specified has not yet been
advanced.
3. A offers $100 to anyone who contracts a certain disease
after using specified medicine as directed. B, C, and D
severally use the medicine as directed and contract the dis-
ease. A has contracted with each of them to pay him $100.
In this case, the exercise of the power by B has no effect up-
on the powers of C and D, because they reasonably under-
stand this to accord with the intention of A.
Annotation:
This Section is not inconsistent with Missouri law, and is illus-
trated by reward cases. "The offer of the reward, when acted
upon, becomes a contract." Cornwell w. St. Louis Transit Co.
(1903) 100 Mo. App. 258, 73 S. W. 305. To the same general
effect: Smith v. Vernon County (1905) 188 Mo. 501, 87 S. W.
949; Walsh v. St. Louis Exposition & Music Hall Assn. (1887)
90 Mo. 459, 2 S. W. 842, affirming 16 Mo. App. 502. As to the
reasonable interpretation of an offer of reward, see Hoggard v.
Dickerson (1914) 180 Mo. App. 70, 165 S. W. 1135.
Passages in a university catalog were held to be an offer to
contract with a prospective student in Niedermeyer v. Curators
of State University (1895) 61 Mo. App. 654. The offer to con-
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tract in a letter of credit is discussed in Bank of Seneca v. First
National Bank (1904) 105 Mo. App. 722, 78 S. W. 1092. A cer-
tain letter of commendation was held not to be a letter of credit
in Liggett v. Levy (1911) 233 Mo. 590, 136 S. W. 299. Con-
tracts may originate in advertisements addressed to the general
public; the manifested intent should govern the interpretation.
Anderson v. Public Schools (1894) 122 Mo. 61, 27 S. W. 610,
alleged contract for public work.
Section 29. How AN OFFER MAY BE ACCEPTED.
An offer may invite an acceptance to be made by merely an
affirmative answer, or by performing or refraining from per-
forming a specified act, or may contain a choice of terms from
which the offeree is given the power to make a selection in his
acceptance.
Illustrations:
1. A offers B one hundred tons of coal at $15 a ton pay-
able in thirty days. B's mere manifestation of assent cre-
ates a contract.
2. A offers B any amount of coal, up to one hundred tons,
for which B will promise to pay $15 a ton. In order to ac-
cept this offer B must specify the amount of coal he desires.
3. A makes a bid at an auction sale. The auctioneer can
accept by letting the hammer fall, by saying "sold," or by
saying any words manifesting acceptance.
4. A offers B to sell him in monthly instalments the coal
which B may require in his business during the next six
months, not exceeding one hundred tons in any one month.
It is a question of interpretation under all circumstances of
the case whether this offer is for a series of contracts to be
formed from time to time during the next six months, or is
for a single contract to be made immediately by which B
undertakes to buy all he requires during six months, up to
one hundred tons monthly. On the bare facts given, the
latter is the true interpretation.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. In Lancaster
v. Elliott (1887) 28 Mo. App. 86, the Court said: "A proposal
being made, the most direct form of acceptance which will de-
velop, at the same time, a meeting of the minds and the forma-
tion of a lawful contract, is the simple declaration in words to that
effect, whether orally or in writing. If no such declaration is
made, the law, nevertheless, sometimes finds in the acts of the
person to whom the proposal was offered an acceptance no less
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binding and conclusive." See Murphy v. Murphy (1886) 22 Mo.
App. 18, oral assent to proposal to build house; Allen v. Chouteau(1890) 102 Mo. 309, 14 S. W. 869, acceptance of offer by paying
taxes on land in which offeror had an interest; Lungstrass v.
German Insurance Co. (1871) 48 Mo. 201, a contract between
principal and agent where acceptance of principal's offer was a
book entry by agent. In Martin v. Ray County Coal Co. (1921)
288 Mo. 241, 232 S. W. 149, there was a binding acceptance of an
offer containing a choice of terms as to the amount of coal to be
purchased from a mining company-100 to 300 tons per day.
See also Fuller v. Presnell (Mo. App. 1921) 233 S. W. 502, "from
one hundred to one hundred fifty thousand" feet of lumber.
Section 30. OFFER MAY PROPOSE A SINGLE CONTRACT OR A
NUMBER OF CONTRACTS.
An offer may propose the formation of a single contract by a
single acceptance or the formation of a number of contracts by
successive acceptances from time to time.
Comment:
a. An offer may request several acts or promises as the indi-
visible exchange for the promise or promises in the offer, or it
may request a series of contracts to be made from time to time.
Such a series may be a series of unilateral contracts or a series
of bilateral contracts, depending upon the terms of the offer.
Whether several promises create several contracts or are all
part of one contract is determined by principles of interpretation
stated in Chapter 9.
Illustrations:
1. A offers B, a railway company, such quantities of cer-
tain goods as B's storekeeper may order from time to time
during the next twelve months. Each order of B's store-
keeper during that period creates a contract for the quantity
ordered.
2. A offers B to sell and deliver to him during the follow-
ing year any quantity of goods between 4000 and 6000 pounds
in amount which B may specify. B must within a reasonable
time specify a particular amount of not less than 4000
pounds and not more than 6000 pounds in order to create a
contract; and there can be but one acceptance and one
contract.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. But in reading
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some of the pertinent Missouri cases, one should pay attention to
the principles involved rather than the terminology used. See
annotation under Section 12 for Missouri usage of the term
unilateral as indicating an unaccepted offer. In Schlitz Brew-
ing Co. v. Mo. Poultry & Game Co. (1921) 287 Mo. 400, 229 S.
W. 813, a continuing offer to sell beer was referred to as a uni-
lateral promise. It was clearly intended as a proposal for a
number of contracts to spring into existence from successive ac-
ceptances. In Malloy v. Egyptian Tie & Timber Co. (1923) 212
Mo. App. 429, 247 S. W. 469, a continuing offer to buy railroad
ties was referred to as a unilateral contract. It was interpreted
as in the preceding case and contracts were held to exist with
reference to acceptances by performance before the offer was
revoked. In the following cases, likewise, the offer, sometimes
called a contract, was held to propose a series of contracts.
Roberts v. Harmount Tie & Lumber Co. (Mo. App. 1924) 264
S. W. 448; Saginaw Medicine Co. v. Dykes (1922) 210 Mo. App.
399, 238 S. W. 556; Campbell v. American Handle Co. (1906)
117 Mo. App. 19, 94 S. W. 815.
In Hudson v. Browning (1915) 264 Mo. 58, 174 S. W. 393, the
offer, referred to as a void contract, contained a definite promise
on one side to buy railroad ties, and on the other side a nominal
promise, held by the court to be vague, indefinite, uncertain and
therefore meaningless. If both promises had been definite
there would have been a binding single contract. In American
Pub. & Engr. Co. v. Walker (1901) 87 Mo. App. 503, a written
offer to prepare advertising matter for one year, as originally
formulated, was referred to as a unilateral contract. It was
interpreted as proposing one single contract which was held to
be accepted by one single acceptance. In Smith v. Coal Com-
pany (Mo. App. 1924) 260 S. W. 545, an offer to sell coal to meet
the "requirements" of an established business during a par-
ticular year was held to contemplate one single contract. To
same effect is Royal Brewing Co. v. Uncle Sam Oil Co. (1920)
205 Mo. App. 616, 226 S. W. 656.
Section 31. PRESUMPTION THAT OFFER INWTES A BmATERAL
CONTRACT.
In case of doubt it is presumed that an offer invites the forma-
tion of a bilateral contract by an acceptance amounting in effect
to a promise by the offeree to perform what the offer requests,
rather than the formation of one or more unilateral contracts by
actual performance on the part of the offeree.
Comment:
a. It is not always easy to determine whether an offeror re-
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quests an act or a promise to do the act. As a bilateral contract
immediately and fully protects both parties, the interpretation
is favored that a bilateral contract is proposed.
Illustrations:
1. A says to B: "If you will work in my garden next week
I will give you $5 a day." B says, "I'll do it." There is a bi-
lateral contract.
2. A says to B: "rf you will let me have that table that
you are making, when it is finished, I will give you $100 for
it." B replies, "All right." There is a bilateral contract.
Annotation:
This Section is not inconsistent with Missouri law, although
no express authority has been found for the existence of a pre-
sumption. In Lewis v. Atlas Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1876) 61 Mo.
534, the court said: "It very frequently happens that contracts
on their face and by their express terms appear to be obligatory
on one party only; but in such cases, if it be manifest that it was
the intention of the parties, and the consideration upon which
one party assumed an express obligation, that there should be a
corresponding and correlative obligation on the other party, such
corresponding and correlative obligation will be implied." War-
ren v. Ray County Coal Co. (1919) 200 Mo. App. 442, 207 S. W.
883 is an apposite case, involving the construction of a disputed
contract which was held to be bilateral and binding. Harring-
ton v. K. C. Cable Ry. Co. (1895) 60 Mo. App. 223 is similar to
Illustration 1 of the text.
Section 32. OFFER MUST BE REASONABLY CERTAIN IN ITS
TERMS.
An offer must be so definite in its terms, or require such
definite terms in the acceptance, that the promises and perform-
ances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain.
Comment:
a. Inasmuch as the law of contracts deals only with duties de-
fined by the expressions of the parties, the rule of this Section is
one of necessity as well as of law. The law cannot subject a per-
son to a contractual duty or give another a contractual right
unless the character thereof is fixed by the agreement of the
parties. A statement by A that he will pay B what A chooses
is no promise. A promise by A to give B employment is not
wholly illusory, but if neither the character of the employment
nor the compensation therefor is stated, the promise is so in-
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definite that the law cannot enforce it, even if consideration is
given for it.
b. Promises may be indefinite in time or in place, or in the
work or the property to be given in exchange for the promise.
In dealing with such cases the law endeavors to give a sufficiently
clear meaning to offers and promises where the parties intended
to enter into a bargain, but in some cases this is impossible.
c. Offers which are originally too indefinite may later acquire
precision and become valid offers, by the subsequent words or
acts of the offeror or his assent to words or acts of the offeree.
Illustrations:
1. A promises B to serve him as a chauffeur and B prom-
ises A to pay him at the rate of $5 a day. For any services
actually rendered under such an offer B is bound to pay at
the agreed rate, but beyond each day on which service begins
no executory obligation is created, in the absence of usage
fixing the length of service customary in employment of the
sort agreed upon. In dealing with personal service the pre-
sumption that the performance shall continue a reasonable
time is not adopted.
2. A promises B to serve him as a chauffeur, and B prom-
ises to pay him $100 a month. The full period for which the
service is expected to continue is not stated. There is at
once a bilateral contract for a month's service. It is often
a difficult question of interpretation to determine whether
an agreement specifies merely a rate of compensation, or
indicates, at least impliedly, an understanding that the em-
ployment shall continue for not less than one of the periods
for which the rate is stated, in which case there is a contract
for one period, and at its expiration an offer for another in
the absence of revocation.
3. A promises B to employ him for a stated compensation
and B promises A to serve therefor as long as B is able to do
the work, or as long as a specified business is carried on.
These promises create contracts, as a method is provided
for determining the length of the engagement.
4. A promises B to sell and deliver goods to him, and B
promises A to pay a specified price therefor. Though no
time for performance is fixed, there is a contract, the pre-
sumption being that the parties intended performance to be
made within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time
is a question of fact, in each case depending on the character
of the goods and all surrounding circumstances.
5. A and B promise that certain performances shall be
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mutually rendered by them "immediately" or "at once," or
"promptly," or "as soon as possible," or "in about one
month." All these promises are sufficiently definite to form
contracts.
6. A promises B to sell to him and B promises A to buy of
him goods "at cost plus a nice profit." The promise is too
indefinite to form a contract.
7. A promises B to execute a conveyance, or a year's lease,
of specified property and B promises A to pay therefor. Al-
though the terms of leases and conveyances vary, the prom-
ises are interpreted as providing for documents in the form
in common local use, and are sufficiently definite to form
contracts.
8. A promises B to give him any one of a number of speci-
fied things which A shall choose, and B promises A to pay a
specified price. There is a contract. A method is provided
for determining what A is to give, and though what he gives
is subject to his choice, he must give some one of the things
specified. If he fails to do so the law will assess damages
against him on the basis of the least valuable of the subjects
of choice.
9. A promises B to do specified work or to transfer certain
property and B promises A to pay therefor if it is satis-
factory to him. These promises form contracts since a
method is provided for determining B's duty which is not
dependent on his mere whim but requires the exercise of
honest judgment.
10. A promises B to do a specified piece of work and B
promises A to pay a price to be thereafter mutually agreed.
As the only method of settling the price is dependent on
future agreement of the parties, and as either party may re-
fuse to agree, there is no contract. (It should be noticed
that retention of a benefit under these circumstances may
give rise to a quasi contractual duty.)
11. A promises B to construct a building according to
stated plans and specifications, and B promises A to pay
$30,000 therefor. It is also provided that the character of
the window fastenings shall be subject to further agreement
of the parties. The indefiniteness of the agreement with
reference to this minor matter will not prevent the forma-
tion of a contract.
12. A promises B to sell to him and B promises A to buy
of him all goods of a certain character which B shall need
in his business during the ensuing year. There is a contract.
Awnotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. The Illustrations
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seem to be in harmony with Missouri decisions except Illustra-
tion 2. According to the decision in Evans v. Railway Co.
(1887) 24 Mo. App. 114, the facts in Illustration 2 constitute a
contract terminable at will with compensation fixed on the basis
of $100 a month. To the same effect: Brookfield v. Drury Col-
lege (1909) 139 Mo. App. 339, 123 S. W. 86; Davis v. Pioneer
Life Ins. Co. (1914) 181 Mo. App. 353, 172 S. W. 67. For a com-
parison of conflicting views, see Annotation, 11 A. L. R. 469.
General Rule. The rule of this Section has been stated
negatively as follows: "When a contract is so uncertain or in-
definite in its provisions that the court is unable to ascertain
therefrom the meaning or the agreement of the parties thereto,
then the courts will not hesitate to declare it null and void. This
is a sound principle of law, and is predicated upon the idea that
the parties themselves, and not the court, must make their own
contracts and agreements ;" held, that a particular promise, al-
though "very singular and unusual," was "definite and certain
in its terms" and therefore binding. Voorhees v. Louisiana
Purchase Exposition Co. (1912) 243 Mo. 418, 147 S. W. 783.
When an alleged contract for sale of a drug store as a going
concern does not state time for delivery of possession, the law
will imply a reasonable time and will permit changes in the stock
not outside the usual course of business. Vantrees v. Trimble
(1923) 214 Mo. App. 30, 251 S. W. 396. For other cases in
which challenged terms were held to be definite enough, see
Browning v. North Missouri Cent. Ry. Co. (Mo. 1916) 188 S. W.
143, "more or less"; Brewer v. Lepman (1908) 127 Mo. App.
693, 106 S. W. 1107, "prompt"; Harrington v. Kansas City Cable
Ry. Co. (1895) 60 Mo. App. 223, "constant employment."
On the other hand, an alleged promise to give plaintiff "some
learning" is too indefinite to form the basis of an express contract
to furnish an education. Ryan v. Lynch (1880) 9 Mo. App. 18.
If before delivery, goods are alleged to have been sold "as
cheaply as they could be bought for elsewhere," the stipulation
as to price is too indefinite. Stout v. Carruthersville Hardware
Co. (1908) 131 Mo. App. 520, 110 S. W. 619. For other cases
in which promissory language was held too vague for effecting
bilateral contracts, see Anderson v. Hall (1918) 273 Mo. 307, 202
S. W. 539, promise to contemplate a contract; Hudson v. Brown-
ing (1915) 264 Mo. 58, 174 S. W. 393, qualified promise to cut
railroad ties; Bay v. Bedwell (Mo. App. 1929) 21 S. W. (2d)
203, promise to use influence; Jennings v. Hirsch Rolling Mill
Co. (Mo. App. 1922) 242 S. W. 1003, promise to supply uncer-
tain quantity of iron; Burks v. Stain (1896) 65 Mo. App. 455,
conditional promise to pay bonus.
Offer of Satisfactory Performance. The term satisfactory is
definite enough for contractual purposes. The distinction be-
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tween what is satisfactory to a reasonable man in ordinary
standardized transactions and what is satisfactory to a par-
ticular person in isolated matters involving taste, fancy or judg-
ment, is recognized in Missouri. The leading case is Mullally
v. Greenwood (1895) 127 Mo. 138, 29 S. W. 1001, satisfactory
lease. See also Berthold v. St. Louis Electric Const. Co. (1901)
165 Mo. 280, 65 S. W. 784, satisfactory rate of progress in con-
struction work; Bowen v. Buckner (Mo. App. 1916) 183 S. W.
704, satisfactory picture of a dead son; Cann v. Church of Re-
deemer (1905) 111 Mo. App. 164, 85 S. W. 994, satisfactory
plans for a church.
Offers to Supply Needs or Wishes. "A contract for the future
delivery of personal property is void, for want of consideration
and mutuality, if the quantity to be delivered is conditioned by
the will, wish, or want of one of the parties; but it may be sus-
tained if the quantity is ascertainable otherwise with reasonable
certainty. An accepted offer to furnish or deliver such articles
of personal property as shall be needed, required, or consumed by
the established business of the acceptor during a limited time is.
binding, and may be enforced, because it contains the implied
agreement of the acceptor to purchase all the articles that shall
be required in conducting his business during this time from
the party who makes the offer." The foregoing passage from a
well-known Federal case was quoted, approved and applied in
the following Missouri cases: Moran Bolt & Nut Mfg. Co. v. St.
Louis Car Company (1908) 210 Mo. 715, 109 S. W. 47, binding;
Royal Brewing Company v. Uncle Sam Oil Company (1920) .205
Mo. App. 616, 226 S. W. 656, binding. To the same effect: Hud-
son v. Browning (1915) 264 Mo. 58, 174 S. W. 393, not binding;
Smith v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. (Mo. App. 1924) 260 S. W.
545, binding; Saginaw Medicine Co. v. Dykes (1922) 210 Mo.
App. 399, 238 S. W. 556, not binding; Rozier v. St. Louis S. F. R.
Co. (1910) 147 Mo. App. 290, 126 S. W. 532, binding; Campbell
v. American Handle Co. (1906) 117 Mo. App. 19, 94 S. W. 815,
not binding.
Section 33. AN INDEFINITE OFFER MAY CREATE A CONTRACT
UPON PERFORMANCE BY OFFEREE.
An offer which is too indefinite to create a contract if verbally
accepted, may, by entire or partial performance on the part of the
offeree, create a contract.
Illustration:
1. A says to B: "I will employ you for some time at $10 a
day." An acceptance by B either orally or in writing will
not create a contract; but if B serves one or more days a
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unilateral contract arises binding A to pay $10 for each
day's service.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. In Roberts v.
Harmount Tie & Lumber Co. (Mo. App. 1924) 264 S. W. 448, an
agreement, invalid as a bilateral contract because of uncertainty,
was held valid after execution. To same effect: Stout v. Car-
ruthersville Hardware Company (1908) 131 Mo. App. 520, 110
S. W. 619.
Section 34. OFFER UNTIL TERMINATED MAY BE ACCEPTED.
An offer until terminated gives to the offeree a continuing
power to create a contract by acceptance of the offer.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. "An offer is
continuing until its withdrawal and the withdrawal communi-
cated, and, if the offer is accepted and notification received by the
offerer before a withdrawal of the offer, the agreement there-
upon becomes complete and binding." Cook ,v. Kerr (Mo. App.
1917) 192 S. W. 466. For authority to the same effect, see
Krohn-Fechheimer Co. v. Palmer (1920) 282 Mo. 82, 221 S. W.
353.
Section 35. How AN OFFER MAY BE TERMINATED; EFFECT OF
TERMINATION.
(1) An offer may be terminated by
(a) rejection by the offeree, or
(b) lapse of time, or the happening of a condition stated in
the offer as causing termination, or
(c) death or destruction of a person or thing essential for the
performance of the proposed contract, or
(d) supervening legal prohibition of the proposed contract;
or, except as stated in Sections 45, 46 and 47, by
(e) revocation by the offeror, or
(f) the offeror's death or such insanity as deprives him of
legal capacity to enter into the proposed contract.
(2) Where an offer is terminated in one of these ways a con-
tract cannot be created by subsequent acceptance.
Illustration:
1. A makes an offer to B and adds: "This offer will re-
main open for a week." B rejects the offer the following
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day, but within a week from the making of the offer ac-
cepts it. There is no contract.
Annotation:
Subdivision (1) is in effect an outline of Sections 36 to 50 in-
clusive. For Missouri annotations see those Sections.
Subdivision (2) is in accord with Missouri law. In Egger v.
Nesbitt (1894) 122 Mo. 667, 27 S. W. 385, there was an offer
followed by a counter-offer (rejection, see Section 38) followed
by a challenged acceptance of the original offer; held no contract.
Section 36. WHAT IS A REJECTION OF AN OFFER.
An offer is rejected when the offeror is justified in inferring
from the words or conduct of the offeree that the offeree intends
not to accept the offer or to give it further consideration.
Comment:
a. This Section states a general definition of what amounts to
a rejection. The more particular rules in the two following
Sections state the common methods of rejection.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. Paramore v.
Campbell (1912) 245 Mo. 287, 149 S. W. 6, rejection by refusal
to sign written proposal; Eads v. City of Carondelet (1867) 42
Mo. 113, rejection by passage of city ordinance; Goodrich Rub-.
ber Co. v. Newman (Mo. App. 1925) 271 S. W. 1029, rejection of
offer to compromise by filing suit within one week; Union Serv-
ice Co. v. Drug Company (1910) 148 Mo. App. 327, 128 S. W. 7,
offer and rejection in course of correspondence.
Section 37. COMMUNICATION BY OFFEREE DECLINING THE OF-
FER Is A REJECTION.
A communication from the offeree to the offeror, stating in
effect that the offeree declines to accept the offer is a rejection.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. In Cangas v.
Rumsey Mfg. Co. (1889) 37 Mo. App. 297, an alleged contract
was based upon correspondence; the court held that "plaintiff's
letter of January 29 was not an acceptance, but a rejection of the
defendant's offer contained in his letter of January 21."
Section 38. COUNTER-OFFER BY OFFEREE IS A REJECTION.
A counter-offer by the offeree, relating to the same matter as
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the original offer, is a rejection of the original offer, unless the
offeree at the same time states in express terms that he is still
keeping the original offer under advisement.
Comment:
a. A counter-offer amounts in legal effect to a statement by
the offeree not only that he is willing to do something different
in regard to the matter proposed, but also that he will not agree
to the proposal of the offeror. A counter-offer must fulfill the
requirements of an original offer. There is none unless there
is a manifestation sufficient to create a power of acceptance in
the original offeror. This distinguishes a counter-offer from a
mere inquiry regarding the possibility of different terms, a re-
quest for a better offer, or a comment upon the terms of the
offer. Likewise, an offer dealing with an entirely new matter
and not proposed as a substitution for the original offer is not a
counter-offer.
Illustrations:
1. A offers B to sell him Blackacre for $5000, stating that
the offer will remain open for thirty days. B replies, "I
will pay $4800 for Blackacre," and on A's declining that, B
writes, "I accept your offer to sell for $5000." There is no
contract, although B's acceptance of these terms was made
within the time limit originally fixed by A in his offer.
2. A makes the same offer to B as that stated in Illustra-
tion 1, and B replies, "Won't you take less ?" To which A
answers, "No." An acceptance thereafter by B, if within
the time allowed under A's offer, creates a contract.
3. A makes the same offer to B as that stated in Illustration
1. B replies, "I am keeping your offer under advisement, but if
you wish to close the matter at once I will give you $4800."
A does not reply, and within the thirty days limited in the
original offer B accepts it. There is a contract.
Annotation:
The first part of this Section is in accord with Missouri law.
Bruner v. Wheaton (1870) 46 Mo. 363, principle recoknized but
held not to apply to facts in the case. In the following cases
the principle was not only recognized but applied as a rule of
decision: Railroad Company v. Joseph & Bros. Co. (1912) 169
Mo. App. 174, 152 S. W. 394; Duke v. Compton (1892) 49 Mo.
App. 304; Robertson v. Tapley (1892) 48 Mo. App. 239; Lan-
caster v. Elliot (1890) 42 Mo. App. 503.
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The second part of this Section is not inconsistent with Mis-
souri law. No direct authority has been found. But see Sarran
v. Rickards (1910) 151 Mo. App. 656, 132 S. W. 285, where a
counter-offer was followed by an inquiry which apparently did
not have the effect of a rejection of the counter-offer.
Section 39. TIME WHEN REJECTION Is EFFECTIVE.
Rejection by mail or telegram does not destroy the power of
acceptance until received by the offeror, but limits the power so
that a letter or telegram of acceptance started after the sending
of the rejection is only a counter-offer unless the acceptance is
received by the offeror before he receives the rejection.
Illustrations:
1. A makes B an offer by mail. B immediately after re-
ceiving the offer mails a letter of rejection. Within the time
permitted by the offer B accepts. This acceptance creates a
contract only if received before the rejection.
Annotation:
No pertinent Missouri cases have been found.
Section 40. WHAT LAPSE OF TIME TERMINATES AN OFFER.
(1) The power to create a contract by acceptance of an offer
terminates at the time specified in the offer, or, if no time is
specified, at the end of a reasonable time.
(2) What is a reasonable time is a question of fact, depending
on the nature of the contract proposed, the usages of business
and other circumstances of the case which the offeree at the time
of his acceptance either knows or has reason to know.
(3) In the absence of usage or a provision in the offer to the
contrary, and subject to the rule stated in Section 51, an offer
sent by mail is seasonably accepted if an acceptance is mailed at
any time during the day on which the offer is received.
Comment:
a. An offeror may fix any time that he wishes as that within
which acceptance must be made. He need not make the time a
reasonable one. If, however, no time is fixed the offeree is justi-
fied in assuming that a reasonable time is intended, and the law
adopts this assumption.
b. Where a bilateral contract is contemplated a reasonable
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time for making the return promise requested is generally brief.
Especially is this true in regard to commercial contracts.
c. Where a unilateral contract is contemplated, assent to the
proposition is manifested by performing or refraining from per-
forming an act, and a reasonable time for so doing is necessarily
a reasonable time for acceptance. If, therefore, in the nature
of the case what is requested cannot be done without considerable
delay, the time within which acceptance may be made is equally
long.
Illustrations:
1. A publishes an offer of reward for information lead-
ing to the arrest and conviction of a murderer. B, intend-
ing to obtain the reward, gives the requested information a
year after the publication of the offer. There is a contract.
2. While A and B are engaged in conversation, A makes B
an offer to which B then makes no reply, but a few hours
later meeting A again, B states that he accepts the offer.
There is no contract unless the offer or the surrounding
circumstances indicate that the offer is intended to continue
beyond the immediate conversation.
3. A sends B an offer by mail to sell a piece of land. B
does not reply for three days and then sends an acceptance.
It is a question of fact under the circumstances of the par-
ticular case whether the delay is unreasonable.
4. A makes B an offer by mail to sell goods. B receives
the offer at the close of business hours and accepts it by let-
ter promptly the next morning. There is a contract.
5. A sends B a telegraphic offer to sell oil which at the
time is subject to rapid fluctuations in price. Though the
offer is not received until near the close of business hours, a
telegraphic reply sent the next day is too late. There is no
contract.
Annotation:
Subdivision (1) of this Section is in accord with Missouri law.
The leading case is James & Sons v. Fruit Jar & Bottle Co.
(1897) 69 Mo. App. 207. To the same effect: Eagle Mill Co. v.
Caven (1898) 76 Mo. App. 458.
Subdivision (2) is in accord with Missouri law. Williams v.
Implement Company (Mo. App. 1917) 198 S. W. 425. The word
"prompt" modifies the general rule as to a reasonable time.
Brewer v. Lepman (1908) 127 Mo. App. 693, 106 S. W. 1107.
Subdivision (3) is not inconsistent with Missouri law. No
Missouri cases directly in point have been found. See Minne-
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sota Linseed Oil Co. v. Collier White Lead Co. (1876) 4 Dill. 431,
Fed. Cas. No. 9,635, a leading Federal case based on a Missouri
transaction.
Section 41. REVOCATION BY COMMUNICATION FROM OFFEROR
RECEIVED BY OFFEREE.
Revocation of an offer may be made by a communication from
the offeror received by the offeree which states oi implies that
the offeror no longer intends to enter into the proposed contract,
if the communication is received by the offeree before he has
exercised his power of creating a contract by acceptance of the
offer.
Comment:
a. Revocation, as stated in Section 35, does not terminate an
offer in cases within the rules stated in Sectioils 45, 46 and 47.
b. What amounts to receipt of revocation within the meaning
of the rule is considered in Section 69.
Illustration:
1. A makes by mail an offer to B and subsequently by
mail revokes the offer. Before receiving the revocation,
however, B has mailed an acceptance. The revocation is
ineffectual; and although on receiving the revocation B as-
sumes that there is no contract and changes his position in.
reliance on that assumption, A is not precluded from assert-
ing the existence of a contract, for when B changed his posi-
tion B knew all of the facts and simply made a mistake of
law.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. In Price v. At-
kinson (1906) 117 Mo. App. 52, 94 S. W. 816, the court said:
"An acceptance of an order for goods is effectual from the
moment the letter of acceptance, properly directed and stamped,
is deposited in the post office, or, if by wire, the moment the
telegram is paid for and delivered to the telegraph company for
transmission. But a revocation of an order does not take effect
until the letter or telegram revoking the order is actually re-
ceived, hence defendant's letter and telegram were too late to
revoke the order. The contract, if the order itself was sufficient,
was completed by plaintiff's acceptance, before the arrival of
either defendant's letter or telegram of revocation; therefore, if
the subject-matter of the order is sufficiently definite and certain
in its terms to constitute a contract, defendant cannot escape
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liability for the agreed price or value of the goods by his refusal
to receive them." To the same effect: Outcault Ad. Co. v. Wil-
son (1915) 186 Mo. App. 492, 172 S. W. 394, revocation of offer
for advertising service; Sarran v. Richards (1910) 151 Mo.
App. 656, 132 S. W. 285, revocation of counter-offer to sell land;
Chapman v. Adams (1920) 204 Mo. App. 659, 219 S. W. 132, rev-
ocation of proposal to compromise.
Section 42. ACQUISITION BY OFFEREE OF INFORMATION THAT
OFFEROR HAS SOLD OR CONTRACTED TO SELL OFFERED INTEREST.
Where an offer is for the sale of a property interest of any
kind, if the offeror, after making the offer, sells or contracts to
sell the interest to another person, and the offeree acquires re-
liable information of that fact, the offer is revoked.
Comment:
a. Since revocation does not terminate offers falling within the
rules stated in Sections 45, 46 and 47, the present Section has no
application to such offers.
Illustrations:
1. A offers Blackacre to B at a stated price, and gives B
a week within which to consider the proposal. Within a
week B learns that A has contracted to sell Blackacre to C,
but, nevertheless, sends a formal acceptance, which is re-
ceived by A within the week. There is no contract between
A and B.
2. A offers to sell B a hundred shares of stock at a stated
price, and gives B a week within which to consider the pro-
posal. Within the week the market price of the stock ad-
vances rapidly to a point much above the price named in the
offer. B, knowing of this, sends an acceptance which is re-
ceived by A within the week. There is a contract. Knowl-
edge that an offeror may no longer desire to fulfil his offer
does not itself affect a revocation.
Annotation:
This Section is not inconsistent with Missouri law. No ex-
press authority has been found. The following dictum by Lamm,
J. may be helpful: "A power to sell may be revoked by a sale of
the subject-matter by the donor of the power or a sale by another
agent, by death, by express revocation, or by the performance of
some act resulting in its revocation by necessary implication.
Under given circumstances notice of revocation to third parties
dealing with the agent is necessary." Kilpatrick v. Wiley (1906)
197 Mo. 123, 95 S. W. 213.
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Section 43. How AN OFFER MADE BY ADVERTISEMENT OR GEN-
ERAL NOTICE MAY BE REVOKED.
An offer made by advertisement in a newspaper, or by a gen-
eral notice, to the public or to a number of persons whose identity
is unknown to the offeror, is revoked by an advertisement or
general notice given publicity equal to that given to the offer.
Comment:
a. In the case of such an offer as is stated in this Section, revo-
cation is not likely to be inoperative within the rules stated in
Sections 45 and 46; but the rule stated in Section 47 may prevent
a revocation within the rule of the present Section from being
operative.
Illustration:
1. A posts a notice in a post office, offering a reward for
the apprehension of B, a criminal. Before an acceptance of
the offer A posts another notice in the same place, stating
that he withdraws the offer. The offer is revoked.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. "It is correctly
held in Shuey ,v. United States, 92 U. S. 73, 23 L. ed. 697, a re-
ward case growing out of the assassination of President Lincoln,
that an offer of reward may be withdrawn in the same way it
was made at any time before it was acted upon." Eoggard v.
Dickerson (1914) 180 Mo. App. 70, 165 S. W. 1135, facts outside
the rule.
Section 44. REVOCATION OF OFFER CONTEMPLATING A SERIES
OF CONTRACTS.
A revocable offer contemplating a series of independent con-
tracts by separate acceptances may be effectively revoked so as
to terminate the power to create future contracts, though one or
more of the proposed contracts have already been formed by the
offeree's acceptance.
Comment:
a. An offer may propose several contracts, to arise at separate
times (see Section 30). Such an offer is divisible, and the power
to make an effective revocation continues pari passu with the
continuing power of the offeree to accept.
b. Where an offer contemplates a series of unilateral con-
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tracts, beginning performance of the consideration for any one
of the series makes the offer for that one irrevocable (see Sec-
tions 45 and 52).
Illustrations:
1. A offers B to sell him five tons of steel daily, and ten-
ders five tons at once. B accepts the tender. The same
amount is furnished daily for a number of days. A then
states to B that he revokes the offer. A contract is formed
each day that steel is furnished; but the revocation prevents
the formation of any contracts thereafter. If A's proposal
had been to buy five tons daily during the ensuing month,
the presumption of Section 31 would be applicable. The
offer would require prompt acceptance by B after it was
first received, and if such an acceptance was given, there
could be no revocation during the ensuing month.
2. A offers to guarantee the payment of all bills of ex-
change drawn by B and discounted by C. C discounts one
such bill. A is bound to pay it. A then notifies C that the
guaranty is withdrawn. A is not bound to pay bills subse-
quently discounted.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. The principle is
clearly illustrated by two cases, each involving a continuing of-
fer by defendant to buy railroad ties. In each case there was a
series of acceptances by performance and then a revocation of the
offer. There was no liability of defendant before the first act
of performance and no liability after revocation. But each case
held defendant to liability for all acts of performance before
revocation, and the measure of damages was as in an express
contract and not as in quantum valebant. Roberts v. Harmount
Tie & Lumber Co. (Mo. App. 1924) 264 S. W. 448; Malloy v.
Egyptian Tie & Timber Co. (1923) 212 Mo. App. 429, 247 S. W.
469. To same effect: Jones v. Durgin (1885) 16 Mo. App. 370,
consideration "supplied by performance." See also Wellington V.
Con P. Curran Printing Co. (1925) 216 Mo. App. 358, 268 S. W.
396, offer of bonus at end of each year under profit-sharing plan.
Section 45. REVOCATION OF OFFER FOR UNILATERAL CON-
TRACT; EFFECT OF PART PERFORMANCE OR TENDER.
If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the
consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by the
offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract,
the duty of immediate performance of which is conditional on the
Washington University Open Scholarship
118 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
full consideration being given or tendered within the time stated
in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein, within a reasonable
time.
Comment:
a. What is rendered must be part of the actual performance
requested in order to preclude revocation under this Section.
Beginning preparations though they may be essential to carry-
ing out the contract or to accepting the offer, is not enough.
b. Tender, however, is sufficient. Though not the equivalent
of performance, nevertheless it is obviously unjust to allow so
late withdrawal. There can be no actionable duty on the part
of the offeror until he has received all that he demanded, or until
the condition is excused by his own prevention of performance
by refusing a tender; but he may become bound at an earlier
day. It may be fairly contended that the main offer includes as
a subsidiary promise, necessarily implied, that if part of the re-
quested performance is given, the offeror will not revoke his of-
fer, and that if tender is made it will be accepted. Part per-
formance or tender may thus furnish consideration for the
subsidiary promises. Moreover, merely acting in justifiable re-
liance on an offer may in some cases serve as sufficient reason for
making a promise binding (see Section 90).
Illustrations:
1. A says to B, "I will not ask you to promise to install an
intra-mural telephone system which will work perfectly in
my building, but if you care to try to do it, I will pay you
$1000 if you succeed." B begins the work. When it is nearly
finished, A revokes his offer. If B can prove that he would
have complied with the terms of the offer, he has a right to
damages-the contract price less the cost of completing the
installation. If B cannot prove that he would have fulfilled
the conditions of the offer he cannot recover.
2. A promises B to sell him a specified chattel for $5. B
tenders $5 within a reasonable time. A refuses to accept
the tender. There is a breach of contract.
Annotation:
No clear and direct Missouri authority for this Section has
been found. In Lindell v. Rokes (1875) 60 Mo. 249, there was
an offer for a unilateral contract (i. e., a promise in exchange
for an act to be fully performed by the offeree) whereby the of-
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feror was to pay the offeree $50 if the latter would refrain from
using intoxicants for eight months. In reliance on the offer, the
offeree refrained for the entire period, sued and recovered. Let
it now be supposed that at the end of seven months the offeror
had tried to revoke the offer, and the offeree continued to re-
frain for an additional month and then brought suit. Would
he have recovered? Yes. Such a decision could be justified on
the theory of this Section. Or it could be justified on the theory
of estoppel. School District v. Stocking (1897) 138 Mo. 672, 40
S. W. 656. Or it could be justified on the theory that partial
performance by the offeree implied a promise of complete per-
formance and thus made the contract mutual and bilateral.
American Pub. & Engr. Co. v. Walker (1901) 87 Mo. App. 503.
Charitable Subscriptions. In School District v., Stocking
(1897) 138 Mo. 672, 40 S. W. 656, there was an offer to pay
$25,000 to the plaintiff, apparently in contemplation of specific
action, namely, the purchase by the plaintiff of a site for a
library. In reliance on the offer, plaintiff took preliminary steps
toward the purchase of a library site. Then the offeror was de-
clared insane. Afterwards plaintiff completed the purchase of
the library site. In a suit on the promise contained in the offer,
it was held that the offer had become a binding contract and that
the representatives of the promisor were "estopped to plead
want of consideration." A more recent case is Hardin College v.
Johnson (1928) 226 Mo. App. 285, 3 S. W. (2d) 264, decided in
the same way and announcing established Missouri law as fol-
lows: "Where subscriptions to charitable objects are made, and
on the faith of these subscriptions, and before their withdrawal,
the promisee performs some act-expends money, incurs en-
forceable liabilities, in furtherance of the enterprise-considera-
tion for the subscription is supplied, and it is valid and binding."
This Missouri doctrine goes further than the Restatement be-
cause there is no condition of "full consideration." In Koch v.
Lay (1866) 38 Mo. 147 (leading case) there could never be "full
consideration" and yet the promisor was liable.
Interpretation. When it is doubtful whether the offer is for a
bilateral contract (to be supported by offeree's promise) or for
a unilateral contract (to be supported by offeree's act), the Mis-
souri courts incline toward the bilateral interpretation. See
American Pub. & Engr. Co. tv. Walker (1901) 87 Mo. App. 503,
where an offer, after partial performance by offeree, became
binding as a bilateral contract with respect to the future, the
court saying: "The agreement in question, after the performance
of it had been begun, was manifestly obligatory on the plaintiff
for the full term of one year." In Martin v. Ray County Coal
Co. (1921) 288 Mo. 241, 232 S. W. 149, an offer to sell and de-
liver coal through a period of twenty-six months, followed by
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delivery and acceptance during six months, could not be revoked
by the offeror, because there had come into existence a bilateral
contract.
The facts and conclusion in Illustration 2 are similar to the
facts and holding in Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Century
Realty Co. (1909) 220 Mo. 522, 119 S. W. 400. This case is fre-
quently cited in Missouri and elsewhere as authority for the
proposition that a promissory offer contemplating an act by the
offeree is accepted when the offeree fully performs or tenders
complete performance of the act.
Section 46. OFFERS WHICH ARE THEMSELVES CONTRACTS
CANNOT BE TERMINATED.
An offer for which such consideration has been given or re-
ceived as is necessary to make a promise binding, or which is in
such form as to make a promise in the offer binding irrespective
of consideration, cannot be terminated during the time fixed in
the offer itself, or, if no time is fixed, within a reasonable time,
either by revocation or by the offeror's death or insanity.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law, although it should
be remembered that sealed contracts are not binding in Missouri
in the absence of consideration. Tebeau v. Ridge (1914) 261
Mo. 547, 170 S. W. 871, option in lease to purchase land sup-
ported by promise to pay rent; Aiple-Hemmelmann R. E. Com-
pany v. Spelbrink (1908) 211 Mo. 671, 111 S. W. 480, money
consideration for option paid in advance; Young v. Lanyon (Mo.
App. 1922) 242 S. W. 685, question of damages when a contract
on a produce exchange to enter into a future contract is broken.
Although time is of essence in option contracts, yet the vendor
may waive conditions as to time. Bammert v. Kenefick (Mo.
1924) 261 S. W. 78. For a case where an option was success-
fully challenged for want of consideration, see Davis v. Petty
(1898) 147 Mo. 374, 48 S. W. 944.
Section 47. OFFERS WHICH OFFEROR HAS COLLATERALLY CON-
TRACTED TO KEEP OPEN CANNOT BE TERMINATED.
An offer cannot be terminated during the term therein stated,
or if no term is therein stated for a reasonable time, either by
revocation or by the offeror's death or insanity, if by a collateral
contract the offeror has undertaken not to revoke the offer.
Comment:
a. The promise of the offer itself may be a contract (see See-
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tions 24, 46). For practical purposes the situation is the same
where the offer is accompanied by a collateral contract to keep
the offer open. This collateral contract is in effect specifically
enforced without suit by denying the offeror the power to
terminate his offer.
b. Whether a contract based on such an offer as is within the
rule stated either in this Section or in Section 46 can itself be
specifically enforced, or, if not, what damages are recoverable if
the offeror repudiates or refuses to perform the contract, is de-
termined by the law governing the performance of contracts.
Illustrations:
1. A offers to sell B Blackacre for $5000 at any time with-
in thirty days, and receives $100 for a promise to hold the
offer open for that period. Nevertheless he notifies B a few
days later that the offer is withdrawn. Subsequently, but
within the thirty days, B accepts the offer and tenders $5000,
which A refuses. There is a contract.
Annotation:
This Section seems to be in accord with Missouri law. See
Sooy v. Winter (1915) 188 Mo. App. 150, 175 S. W. 132 and (Mo.
App. 1917) 193 S. W. 845, where the facts did not justify an
application of the principle.
Section 48. TERMINATION OF OFFER BY OFFEROR'S DEATH OR
INSANITY.
A revocable offer is terminated by the offeror's death or such
insanity as deprives him of legal capacity to enter into the pro-
posed contract.
Annotation:
This Section is not inconsistent with Missouri law. The prin-
ciple was apparently recognized in School District v. Stocking
(1897) 138 Mo. 672, 40 S. W. 656. It was claimed that an
adjudication of insanity revoked certain offers; the court held
the offers were accepted by partial performance before the in-
sanity, saying "this occurred before Sheidley was adjudged in-
sane and his insanity or death thereafter could not revoke them."
Section 49. TERMINATION OF OFFER BY DEATH OF ESSENTIAL
PERSON OR DESTRUCTION OF ESSENTIAL THING.
Where a proposed contract requires for its performance the
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
existence of a specific person or thing, and before acceptance the
person dies or the thing is destroyed, the offer is terminated un-
less the offeror assumes the risk of such mischance.
Comment:
a. If the essential person is not dead, but ill or otherwise ap-
parently disabled or the essential thing is injured, it cannot be
said that the offer is automatically terminated, though such facts
may justify the offeror in refusing to fulfil any contract formed
by acceptance.
Annotation:
This Section is not inconsistent with Missouri law. No case
has been found applying the principle to an offer. But Hal v.
School District (1887) 24 Mo. App. 213 recognized and applied
the similar principle that a condition will be implied in a con-
tract (not merely an offer) as to the continued existence of a
particular person or thing when the "evident intention of the
parties" requires it. See dictum quoted in annotation to Sec-
tion 42.
Section 50. TERMINATION OF OFFER BY ILLEGALITY.
Where after the making of an offer and before acceptance the
proposed contract becomes illegal the offer is terminated.
Illustration:
1. A offers B to lend him $1000 for a year at 10 per cent
interest. After the making of the offer but before its ac-
ceptance a usury law is enacted, prohibiting future loans
bearing interest at more than 8 per cent. The offer is there-
by terminated.
Annotation:
No pertinent cases have been found.
Section 51. EFFECT OF DELAY IN COMMUNICATION OF OFFER.
If communication of an offer to the offeree is delayed, the
period within which a contract can be created by acceptance is
not thereby extended if the offeree knows or has reason to know
of the delay, though it is due to the fault of the offeror; but if
the delay is due to the fault of the offeror or to the means of,
transmission adopted by him, and the offeree neither knows nor
has reason to know that there has been delay, a contract can be
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created by acceptance within the period which would have been
permissible if the offer had been despatched at the time that its
arrival seems to indicate.
llustrations:
1. A sends B a misdirected offer which is delayed in de-
livery, as is apparent from the date of the letter or the post-
mark on the envelope, so that the offeree does not receive the
offer until some time later than he would have received it
had the direction been correct. The offeree cannot accept
the offer unless he can do so within the time which would
have been permissible had the offer arrived seasonably.
Annotation:
No pertinent cases have been found.
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